Whilst all litigation revolves around establishing the truth in a particular matter, defamation is fundamentally an area of law where the truth of statements made is at its heart.
Indeed, Section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013 (2013 Act) provides a complete defence in respect of comments made about a third party with a defamatory meaning, where the Court finds that the comments made were substantially true.
When set against this backdrop, the outcome of the case of Wright v McCormack, the appeal for which has recently concluded, is particularly interesting, as the Court analysed the impact of a Claimant in defamation proceedings intentionally misleading the Court in their evidence. Previous blogs found here and here discuss some of the interim stages of the Wright case.
Background
The Defendant, a blogger, and YouTuber, publicly accused the Claimant of being fraudulent in respect of his claims to have been the inventor of Bitcoin. The Claimant sued the Defendant for defamation.
The only issue remaining at trial was whether the comments made satisfied the statutory test of serious harm set out in Section 1 of the 2013 Act. The trial judge had found that the Claimant had lied in respect of his initial case of serious harm, which was abandoned shortly before trial, and accordingly reduced the Claimant’s damages to £1 as a result. The Claimant appealed this decision but did not challenge any of the findings of fact.
Lord Justice Warby dismissed the appeal following a detailed analysis of the law in this area. The judge held that it was established law that, to a point, the purpose of compensation in defamation cases was to vindicate the Claimant’s reputation and that in certain circumstances it may be that the judgment in the Claimant’s favour setting out that the allegations were false could be sufficient to do that.
The trial judge, in this case, had taken into account the Claimant’s dishonest conduct in the prosecution of the claim. Lord Justice Warby found that, whilst this was a novel approach, it was not precluded by the authorities and in fact was a logical extension to them, as the ‘sting’ in this defamation claim was one of dishonesty.
The Claimant’s dishonest approach to evidence in his claim was a relevant factor that the trial judge was entitled to take into account (albeit that Lord Justice Warby did not agree with all of the reasons given by the trial judge in support of his conclusion in this regard).
Comment
This case is an important case in terms of the assessment of damages. It is established law that in certain circumstances evidence of a bad reputation, such as previous criminal conduct, is relevant to the assessment of damages in defamation cases (i.e. if a reputation is already bad, it is difficult to damage it further).
Whilst the Court was clear that ‘mudslinging’ defences should be avoided, this judgment demonstrates that:
- A Claimant can obtain a judgment in their favour setting out that comments made are defamatory;
- Serious harm has occurred in terms of the Claimant’s reputation; and
- That it is appropriate to reduce compensation for the damage sustained as a result of something that the Claimant has done after the defamatory comments were made but before the conclusion of a trial.
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Kevin Modiri is a Partner in our expert Dispute Resolution team, specialising in private litigation, inheritance disputes, data breach claims and defamation claims. He is also recommended by the independently researched publication, The Legal 500.
If you have any questions concerning the subjects discussed in this article, please do not hesitate to contact Kevin or another member of the team in Derby, Leicester, or Nottingham on 0800 024 1976 or via our online enquiry form.
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