Hugh Grant v News Group Newspapers Ltd
Case background
In 2022, Mr Hugh Grant (Claimant) issued a claim against the News Group Newspapers Ltd (Defendant) seeking damages for the misuse of his private information by journalists or other third parties acting or working for and on behalf of The Sun newspaper.
Hugh Grant alleged that from 1995 to 2011 The Sun had obtained confidential information relating to his private life by means of unlawful information-gathering techniques (UIGT), including:
- Hacking his mobile telephone;
- Landline tapping;
- Obtaining information by way of deception, the Claimant refers to this as “Blagging” in his pleadings;
- Bugging his home and car;
- Burglary; and
- Hiring private investigators.
The Defendant applied for summary judgment and/or strike out of the Claimant’s claim arguing that the claim was statute-barred when issued.
The primary limitation period for misuse of private information claim is six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, which is set out within Section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980 (Act).
When issuing his claim, Hugh Grant pleaded reliance on Section 32(1)(b) of the Act which sets out that where:
“any fact relevant to the plaintiff’s right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant… the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the…concealment…or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it”.
It was the Claimant’s position that in 2021, he saw evidence for the first time that showed that the Defendant had targeted him and had carried out UIGT. Hugh Grant said it was only then that he realised that he had a claim against the Defendant in relation to the conduct of employees of The Sun.
The Defendant and The Sun for the purposes of this application accepted the allegations that they had deliberately concealed the UIGT. The Judge therefore determined that for the purpose of the application, the Claimant would only need to show that he had a real prospect at trial of proving that he did not know about the concealment and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered it until 9 March 2016 or later (when limitation had expired).
The law
The Judge considered a number of cases including the case of F11 Group Litigation v HMRC. Within this case, the Lordships considered that the purpose of Section 32(1) of the Act is to ensure that a claimant is not disadvantaged because they are unaware of the circumstances giving rise to a claim as a result of fraud, concealment, or mistake. Hugh Grant contended that he did not know (and could not have reasonably discovered) the facts relevant to the cause of action before he saw the documents in 2021.
The Judge having considered the case law concluded that it is:
“plainly right that if a claim form comprises several distinct causes of action, pleaded as such, and a claimant knew more than six years before issue that they had a worthwhile claim in relation to some but not others, the fact that some causes of action are statute-barred does not mean that all others are”.
The Judge, therefore, determined that he would need to consider each UIGT separately and whether the Claimant had sufficient knowledge of each UIGT prior to the limitation expiring.
The arguments
Counsel for the Defendant relied upon the fact that Hugh Grant was aware at the time of 64 articles published by The Sun containing personal information. Counsel also relied upon various other articles and statements released by the Claimant in support of the Defendant’s position that the Claimant had sufficient information to commence a claim against The Sun prior to the limitation expiring.
Counsel for Hugh Grant submitted that he did not know of the UIGT directed at him by The Sun with sufficient confidence as a result of the continued concealment of truth by the Defendant. Furthermore, Counsel submitted that the factual dispute arising out of what the Claimant believed about the Defendant’s actions/denials at the time would be a matter for a trial.
The decision
Having considered the parties’ submissions, the Judge accepted that the Claimant knew that he had been hacked by the Defendant and at least had a strong suspicion that other tabloid newspapers were involved in the phone hacking. As a result, he made the following conclusions:
“Accordingly, I conclude that Mr Grant’s claim for phone-hacking (whether by journalists, editors, PIs or others) is statute-barred. The question of whether his other pleaded rights of action (landline, tapping, bugging, blagging, burglary and instructions to private investigators to do any of those things or other UIG acts apart from phone-hacking) are statute-barred must be decided as part of the trial, where the evidence will be heard in full. My decision at this stage goes no further than concluding that Mr Grant has a realistically arguable case that those rights of action are not statute-barred.
I will therefore grant NGN summary judgment on its defence of the phone-hacking part of Mr Grant’s claim but dismiss the remainder of its application for summary judgment.”
Comment
This case is a useful indication of how the Court applies Section 32(1)(b) of the Act in practice. Simply because one element of the case is statute-barred does not mean that the other aspects of the case are.
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