Bonnard v Perryman Test 1891: Interim Injunctions in Defamation

When looking into defamation claims, the common law rule in the case of Bonnard v Perryman provides that, although the courts possess a jurisdiction to restrain publication, “in all but exceptional cases” they should not issue an temporary injunction to restrain the publication of a libel which the defendant says it will seek to prove is true except where it is clear that that defence will fail. The test in Bonnard is a much higher threshold than in claims for interim injunctions in privacy claims, where the applicant only needs to establish that their claim is more likely than not to succeed at trial.

What is the Bonnard v Perryman test?

The test established in Bonnard v Perryman is a strict principle applied in defamation cases concerning interim injunctions. Under this rule, an interim injunction to restrain the publication of allegedly defamatory material will not be granted unless the claimant can demonstrate at trial that they would be acting perversely if it did not conclude that the words at issue were defamatory, plainly untrue and not otherwise defensible. This means that, if the defendant asserts in a meaningful way that they intend to justify the publication or defend it through available defences such as truth, fair comment or privilege, the court will not grant an interim injunction.

Why the high threshold exists: freedom of expression

The rationale behind this rule is rooted in the importance of protecting freedom of expression, as enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The courts have consistently upheld this principle, emphasising that the Claimant’s right to protect their reputation is adequately safeguarded at trial, where the Defendant bears the burden of proving the truth of the defamatory statement or other defences.